HDFC Bank Ltd
Market data
| CMP | ₹708 (Screener, 12 Oct 2026, 12:41 IST) |
| Market capitalisation | ₹10,91,097 cr (#1 Indian bank by m-cap) |
| Shares outstanding | ~1,540 cr (post 1:1 bonus, Aug 2025) |
| 52-week high / low | ₹1,020 / ₹682 |
| Return: 1 yr / YTD 2026 | −28% / ≈ −29% (₹991 on 1 Jan 2026) |
| P/E (TTM standalone EPS ₹49.12) | 14.4x |
| P/E FY27E / FY28E (Axis EPS ₹53.2 / ₹62.1) | 13.3x / 11.4x [Est.] |
| P/B standalone (Jun-26 BVPS ₹379) | 1.87x |
| P/B consolidated (BVPS ₹394) | 1.80x |
| Core-bank P/B ex-subsidiaries | ~1.66x [Est.] |
| Dividend yield (FY26 DPS ₹15.5) | 2.19% |
| Face value | ₹1 |
Company overview
| Headquarters | HDFC Bank House, Senapati Bapat Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai 400 013 |
| Incorporated | August 1994 (licensed as one of the first new-generation private banks); listed 1995; NYSE ADR 2001 |
| Promoter | None since 1 Jul 2023: HDFC Ltd (former promoter, 20.83%) merged into the bank. Widely held: FII 39.39%, DII 43.44%, public 16.96% (Sep-26) |
| Chairman | Rajiv Kumar (part-time, independent; RBI-approved 15 Jul 2026) |
| MD & CEO | Sashidhar Jagdishan to 26 Oct 2026 → Anup Bagchi from 27 Oct 2026 (RBI approval 1 Oct 2026) |
| Employees | 2,12,958 (Jun-26), down from 2,18,822 a year earlier |
| Network | 9,694 branches (50% semi-urban/rural), 20,958 ATMs, 14,392 business correspondents, 4,175 towns; 5 overseas branches |
| Customers | ~101–102 mn |
| Balance sheet | Total assets ₹43.98 lakh cr (30 Jun 2026); deposits ₹33.28 lakh cr and gross advances ₹32.20 lakh cr (30 Sep 2026, provisional) |
| Sector | Banking: private-sector universal bank; India's largest private bank and #2 bank by assets after SBI |
What the business is, in plain English
HDFC Bank is India's largest private-sector bank and, since absorbing its parent HDFC Ltd in July 2023, the country's largest mortgage lender in the private sector. It collects deposits from about 100 million customers through roughly 9,700 branches and lends them out as home loans, personal loans, credit cards, vehicle loans, small-business loans and corporate credit. It earns the spread between what it pays depositors and what it charges borrowers (net interest income, ~67% of net revenue), plus fees from cards, payments and selling third-party products. It also controls a listed financial-services group: HDFC Life (50.5%), HDFC AMC (52.3%), HDB Financial Services (74.1%), HDFC ERGO (50.2%) and HDFC Securities (94.0%).
The merger left it with too many loans relative to deposits (a loan-to-deposit ratio of about 110%) and with expensive legacy bonds. Three years on, the ratio is still about 97% and margins are at a post-merger low. In 2026 the bank also went through its worst governance year: the chairman resigned on ethics grounds, an internal probe found improper deposit-interest payments to a state body, a US class action was filed, and the CEO chose not to seek another term. An outsider from ICICI, Anup Bagchi, takes charge on 27 Oct 2026.
Quick verdict scorecard
Data freshness: price and market cap from Screener.in at 12:41 IST on 12 Oct 2026. Financials to Q1 FY27 (quarter ended 30 Jun 2026) from the bank's press release and investor presentation. Balance-sheet growth to 30 Sep 2026 from the provisional Q2 FY27 business update (filed ~4 Oct 2026). Per-share figures are adjusted for the Aug 2025 1:1 bonus.
Analyst Notes
What just happened. HDFC Bank has lost about ₹4.3 lakh crore of market value in 2026. The stock went from ₹991 on 1 Jan to ₹708 today. ICICI Bank now trades at 2.74x book against HDFC's 1.87x. Historically HDFC traded at a premium to ICICI. This is not a credit event: gross NPAs are 1.17%, CET1 is 17.4%, and the bank carries ₹72,400 crore of total provisions, including ₹21,400 crore of floating provisions it does not need today. The de-rating comes from two separate problems that arrived together: the post-merger margin repair has stalled, and trust in governance broke.
The margin problem is structural and slow. The 2023 merger added a low-yield mortgage book funded by HDFC Ltd's wholesale bonds. The bank's plan was to replace those bonds with deposits, bring the loan-to-deposit ratio from ~110% down to 85–90%, and rebuild CASA towards 38–40%. Three years on, the LDR is ~97% (gross advances/deposits, Sep-26) and CASA has fallen to 31.6%. Management quietly dropped the "below 90" target in April 2026 ("the loan deposit ratio is not a constraint"). Q1 FY27 NIM fell to 3.26%, the lowest since the merger. Growth has restarted (+16.3% advances in Sep-26), but it is coming from thin-spread corporate (+18.6% YoY at Jun-26; the Sep-26 split is not yet out) and SME lending and is funded by term deposits (+22.8%), FCNR money and wholesale deposits. That combination grows the balance sheet, but it does not grow margins. On 7 Oct the RBI hiked the repo rate to 5.50%, which reprices loans up faster but makes a deposit-rate war more likely.
The governance problem is the bigger driver of the multiple. The sequence matters:
- 12 Mar 2026: the Audit Committee opened a probe into ~₹45 crore of "differential interest" paid to MSRDC through the marketing budget.
- 18 Mar 2026: Chairman Atanu Chakraborty resigned, citing practices "not in congruence with my personal values and ethics".
- June: a company-commissioned legal review (Wilson Sonsini, Wadia Ghandy) found his statement unsubstantiated. He refused to be interviewed.
- July: the board called MSRDC "business overreach" and fined the CEO, CFO and retail-assets head ₹1 lakh each. The RBI then asked the bank to justify those fines and brought forward its own supervisory review.
- 13 Aug 2026: a US securities class action was filed.
- 29 Aug 2026: Jagdishan declined a third term.
None of this has produced a finding of fraud or personal enrichment, and the money involved is trivial (~0.06% of FY26 PAT). The issue is tone at the top. A deposit-rate workaround by senior management, the board's token response, and an ethics-based chairman exit are the kind of thing foreign institutions de-rate a bank for. FII ownership fell from 48.8% to 39.4% in 15 months. Domestic mutual funds and LIC absorbed the selling.
What the market is pricing. At ₹708 the market values the core bank at roughly 1.66x book after ~₹96/share for the listed and unlisted subsidiaries (net of a 20% holding discount) [Est.]. At ~13x FY27E earnings, it is effectively pricing HDFC as a 14% RoE bank with no premium for franchise or management. Consensus targets (~₹1,030 after Q1) still assume a return to 2.1–2.3x book. I think the sell-side is too generous on the multiple in the near term. The market, in turn, is too harsh on the franchise: 26–29% of India's card spends, ~12% of system deposits, a 39% cost-to-income ratio and a pristine book.
What tempers enthusiasm.
- There is no NIM guidance. The structural levers (bond maturities of ₹40–50k crore over two years, retail mix from 52% back to 60%, and CASA) each take 4–8 quarters.
- The RBI's MSRDC review is open and could bring a penalty, a remuneration clawback or business observations.
- A new outside CEO often "kitchen-sinks" in the first two quarters, through higher provisions or reset guidance. ECL from April 2027 gives him a convenient window.
- Deputy MD Kaizad Bharucha lost the CEO race and is a retention risk. The CFO, Chief Compliance Officer and General Counsel are all new.
What amplifies it.
- The bank is over-capitalised (CET1 17.4% against a ~8.4% CET1 requirement that already includes the conservation buffer and D-SIB surcharge) and over-provisioned ahead of ECL.
- Bagchi has a strong retail-liability record from ICICI, and a large share-linked pay package (up to ₹26.9 crore variable, mostly in stock) aligns him with shareholders.
- The LIC approval to go to 9.99% (from 4.11%) and the MSCI foreign-headroom uplift are technical tailwinds.
- The valuation already discounts much of the bad news.
How to read the rest of this report. Watch three numbers every quarter: (1) NIM on total assets against 3.26%; (2) the CASA ratio against 31.6% and gross LDR against ~97%; (3) any RBI action on MSRDC. My base case is a ₹898 12–18-month value (1.8x FY28E ABV for the core bank plus ₹96 for subsidiaries), about +27%. The path there runs through 2–3 quarters of noise under a new CEO, so I would build the position in tranches rather than all at once: after the 17 Oct results, and again after Bagchi's first commentary.
Business Deep-Dive
History and corporate milestones
| Year | Event |
|---|---|
| Aug 1994 | Incorporated in Mumbai, promoted by HDFC Ltd; among the first private banks licensed after liberalisation |
| 2000 | Merged Times Bank |
| 2001 | NYSE ADR listing (HDB; 1 ADS = 3 shares) |
| 2008 | Acquired Centurion Bank of Punjab |
| Oct 2020 | Sashidhar Jagdishan succeeds Aditya Puri as MD & CEO. RBI bars new digital launches and card sourcing after outages (Dec 2020; card ban lifted Aug 2021, fully lifted Mar 2022) |
| 1 Jul 2023 | Merger of HDFC Ltd (and HDFC Investments, HDFC Holdings) effective. Swap ratio 42 HDFC Bank shares for 25 HDFC Ltd shares; HDFC Life and HDFC ERGO become subsidiaries |
| FY24 (Q4) | ~90% of HDFC Credila sold to BPEA EQT/ChrysCapital (~₹9,060 cr deal; merger condition); 9.99% retained |
| Jun–Jul 2025 | HDB Financial Services IPO: ₹12,500 cr [Fact; issue size cited in S&P's Aug-2025 rating action], incl. ₹10,000 cr OFS by the bank at ₹740 [split and price not re-fetched at QC]; gain ₹9,128 cr booked in Q1 FY26 [Fact, Q1 FY26 press release] |
| Aug 2025 | First-ever bonus issue, 1:1; ₹5 (pre-bonus) special interim dividend |
| Mar–Oct 2026 | Chairman resigns (18 Mar); Rajiv Kumar chairman (15 Jul); CEO declines third term (29 Aug); Anup Bagchi named MD & CEO from 27 Oct 2026 |
How the bank makes money (FY26 standalone)
| Revenue line | ₹ cr | % of net revenue |
|---|---|---|
| Net interest income | 1,28,686 | 67.3% |
| Fees & commissions (sum of quarters) | ~34,880 | 18.2% |
| FX & derivatives | ~6,140 | 3.2% |
| Net trading / MTM (incl. ₹9,128 cr HDB gain) | ~14,250 | 7.5% |
| Misc. (recoveries, dividends) | ~7,260 | 3.8% |
| Net revenue | 1,91,219 | 100% |
Fee mix, Q1 FY27 (₹8,450 cr)
Payments & cards 36% · Third-party products (insurance, MF) 21% · Retail assets 20% · Retail liabilities 16% · Wholesale 7%. [Fact, Q1 FY27 presentation]
Yield on assets 7.7%, cost of funds 4.4% (Q1 FY27), against 8.4% / 4.9% in Q4 FY25. Cost-to-income 39.2%; opex/assets 1.8%.
Products and businesses
| Business | What it does | Scale (latest) |
|---|---|---|
| Mortgages | Home loans and LAP, largely the ex-HDFC Ltd book; sourced in-house and via DSAs | ₹9.0 lakh cr AUM (29% of book), +6.8% YoY; disbursements +14% (Q1 FY27) |
| Retail assets | Personal loans (~30%), auto + two-wheeler (~24%), agri (~17%), cards (~16%), gold/LAS/education/other (~13%) | ₹7.31 lakh cr (23%), +7.7%; 18.5% of US-GAAP retail loans unsecured |
| Credit cards & payments | Largest issuer in India; Visa, Mastercard, RuPay, Diners; co-brands; merchant acquiring | 26.3 mn cards (Mar-26; ~22% of cards outstanding); ~29.5% of card spends (Jun-26); merchant acquiring share 35–36% (mgmt) |
| Business banking (MSME) | Working capital, term loans, government-guaranteed ECLGS 5.0 loans | ₹4.82 lakh cr, +22.3% YoY (fastest); ~₹14,000 cr ECLGS 5.0 disbursed by 30 Jun 2026 |
| Commercial transportation | CV and construction-equipment finance | ₹1.73 lakh cr, +9.8% |
| Corporate & wholesale | Working capital, project finance, trade, supply chain, cash management (CBX), DCM/IB, custody | ₹8.40 lakh cr (27%), +18.6%; 77.6% of rated book AA and above |
| Treasury | ALM, SLR portfolio, FX/derivatives for clients, prop G-sec trading | Investments ₹9.19 lakh cr (Jun-26) |
| Liabilities | SA, CA, term deposits, NRI/FCNR(B), salary accounts, government business | Deposits ₹33.28 lakh cr (Sep-26); CASA ₹10.52 lakh cr; FCNR(B) US$11.5 bn raised Jul–Aug 2026 |
| Wealth, private banking, NRI | SmartWealth, private banking, third-party MF/insurance, demat via HDFC Securities | Wealth AUM: Not Available (not in documents read) |
| Digital stack | New mobile and net banking, PayZapp, XpressWay (40+ products), SmartHub Vyapar, BankOne (AI), WhatsApp banking, CBX, TradeFlow, Xpress Personal Loans | ~60 mn mobile app users (mgmt); GenAI "Neev" platform with five "Lighthouse" programmes going into production in FY27 |
Footprint
| Metric | Mar-24 | Mar-25 | Mar-26 | Jun-26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Branches | 8,738 | 9,455 | 9,689 | 9,694 |
| ATMs / CDMs | 20,938 | 21,139 | 21,172 | 20,958 |
| Cities / towns | 4,065 | 4,150 | 4,175 | 4,175 |
| Employees | 2,13,527 | 2,14,521 | 2,11,178 | 2,12,958 |
| Business correspondents | n/a | n/a | 14,400 | 14,392 |
Branch mix (Jun-26): metro 29%, urban 21%, semi-urban 33%, rural 17%. About 40% of branches are under 5 years old. Business per branch is ~₹330 cr against ₹266 cr in FY23. Branch additions slowed from ~1,500 in FY24 to +717 (FY25), +234 (FY26) and +5 (Q1 FY27): management says distribution spend will be "slightly muted". International: Hong Kong, Singapore, Bahrain, DIFC Dubai (new-client ban since 26 Sep 2025) and GIFT City IFSC. Overseas advances are 1.6% of the book. Certifications: not applicable as for a manufacturer; regulated by the RBI (bank), SEBI (listed entity), the US SEC (20-F filer), DFSA, HKMA, MAS and CBB (overseas branches).
The moat, and what makes it hard to replace
- Distribution plus cost. The largest private branch network, with 50% of branches in semi-urban/rural areas, runs at a 39% cost-to-income ratio. Only ICICI is comparable on cost. [Fact/Analyst View]
- Payments. #1 in cards outstanding (~22%) and in card spends (~29.5%), plus 35–36% of merchant acquiring. This gives sticky, fee-rich relationships, though UPI erodes the low end.
- Underwriting record. GNPA has stayed within 1.1–1.4% through cycles, and is 0.91% excluding agriculture.
- Captive group manufacturers. Life, AMC, ERGO and Securities let the bank keep more of the value of each customer.
- Where the moat is weaker after the merger. Cost of funds (borrowings are 11% of liabilities against 5–6% for the industry) and CASA share. Brand and governance trust took a hit in 2026.
Customers and concentration
~101–102 mn customers, of whom only 14% hold a term deposit (the cross-sell runway management cites). Top-20 borrowers are 10.2% of exposure (Jun-26, up from 9.4% at Mar-26). The top-10 borrowers are 6.8% of exposure, and the single largest is 1.1% [US GAAP, Mar-26]. Largest industry exposures: consumer loans 27.1%, NBFCs 5.6%, real estate 3.7%, retail trade 3.5%. Top-20 depositors as % of deposits: Not Available (FY26 annual report Schedule 18 not parseable this session).
Segment Analysis
(a) Reported segment revenue, standalone (₹ cr)
| Segment | FY24* | FY25 | FY26 | FY26 YoY | Q1 FY26 | Q1 FY27 | Q1 YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treasury | 61,654 | 62,227 | 84,337 | +35.5% | 28,283 | 18,192 | −35.7% |
| Retail Banking | 2,33,638 | 2,83,435 | 3,01,854 | +6.5% | 75,191 | 75,889 | +0.9% |
| Wholesale Banking | 1,75,520 | 1,91,965 | 1,74,506 | −9.1% | 44,790 | 48,671 | +8.7% |
| Other Banking Ops | 30,050 | 35,449 | 36,841 | +3.9% | 8,694 | 9,044 | +4.0% |
| Less inter-segment | (1,93,281) | (2,26,927) | (2,27,484) | (57,758) | (59,612) | ||
| Income from operations | 3,07,582 | 3,46,149 | 3,70,055 | +6.9% | 99,200 | 92,184 | −7.1% |
Reported segment results (PBT, ₹ cr) and margins
| Segment | FY24* | FY25 | FY26 | FY26 YoY | Q1 FY26 | Q4 FY26 | Q1 FY27 | Margin FY26 | Q1 FY27 PBT mix |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treasury | 14,190 | 4,605 | 21,142 | +359% | 12,777 | 1,925 | 2,407 | 25.1% | 9.6% |
| Retail Banking | 15,660 | 27,309 | 32,027 | +17.3% | 3,382 | 10,898 | 10,131 | 10.6% | 40.4% |
| Wholesale Banking | 32,281 | 44,544 | 33,948 | −23.8% | 3,698 | 10,399 | 10,364 | 19.5% | 41.3% |
| Other Banking Ops | 11,104 | 14,364 | 10,416 | −27.5% | 2,017 | 2,562 | 2,796 | 28.3% | 11.1% |
| Unallocated | (2,340) | (2,344) | (2,364) | (581) | (591) | (589) | −2.3% | ||
| Total PBT | 70,895 | 88,478 | 95,169 | +7.6% | 21,292 | 25,193 | 25,108 | 100% |
*FY24 includes only 9 months of the merged entity. Q1 FY26 is distorted: Treasury carries the ₹9,128 cr HDB IPO gain, while Retail and Wholesale bear the ₹9,000 cr floating and ₹1,700 cr contingent provisions. So the ~3x Q1 FY27 YoY rise in Retail/Wholesale results is mostly a base effect. Margin = result ÷ gross segment revenue [Est.]. Source: segment notes to results via 6-K filings.
Consolidated segments (US GAAP, 20-F FY26; ₹ cr)
| Segment | Net revenue FY25 | Net revenue FY26 | Share | PBT FY25 | PBT FY26 | PBT YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retail Banking (incl. business banking) | 1,08,772 | 1,23,650 | 53.1% | 49,350 | 58,725 | +19.0% |
| Wholesale Banking | 34,775 | 28,430 | 12.2% | 27,104 | 22,312 | −17.7% |
| Treasury | 5,399 | 6,323 | 2.7% | 5,135 | 5,957 | +16.0% |
| Insurance (HDFC Life) | 65,572 | 69,257 | 29.8% | 2,055 | 3,981 | +93.7% |
| Others | 4,496 | 5,074 | 2.2% | 2,510 | 2,928 | +16.6% |
| Total | 2,19,013 | 2,32,735 | 100% | 86,155 | 93,903 | +9.0% |
(b) The operating view: advances under management (₹ bn)
| Segment | Sep-23 (mix %) | Mar-25 (mix %) | Jun-25 | Mar-26 | Jun-26 | YoY | QoQ | Mix |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Retail | 53% | 55% | 15,215 | 16,149 | 16,315 | +7.2% | +1.0% | 52% |
| – Mortgages | 29% | 30% | 8,428 | 8,887 | 9,005 | +6.8% | +1.3% | 29% |
| – Retail assets | 24% | 25% | 6,787 | 7,263 | 7,310 | +7.7% | +0.7% | 23% |
| Small & mid-market | 17% | 19% | 5,523 | 6,316 | 6,556 | +18.7% | +3.8% | 21% |
| – Business banking | 12% | 13% | 3,944 | 4,594 | 4,823 | +22.3% | +5.0% | 15% |
| – Commercial transport | 5% | 6% | 1,578 | 1,722 | 1,733 | +9.8% | +0.6% | 6% |
| Corporate & other wholesale | 30% | 26% | 7,082 | 8,108 | 8,401 | +18.6% | +3.6% | 27% |
| Total AUM | 27,820 | 30,573 | 31,272 | +12.4% | +2.3% | 100% | ||
| Less IBPC / BRDS / securitised | (1,288) | (973) | (664) | |||||
| Gross advances | 26,532 | 29,600 | 30,608 | +15.4% | +3.4% |
Sep-26 (provisional): gross advances ₹32,195 bn (+16.3% YoY, +5.2% QoQ); AUM ₹33,075 bn (+15.3%). Segment split for Sep-26 will come with the 17 Oct results.
Management focus by segment (Q1 FY27 call): rebuild retail towards 60% of the book (higher yield); keep MSME/business banking growing; stay "selective" in corporate; grow gold and micro-business (Dukandar) loans from a low base; cross-sell TDs to the 86% of customers without one.
Financials: P&L
Five-year annual P&L
| ₹ cr | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 (merger 1 Jul 23) | FY25 | FY26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Interest earned | 1,27,753 | 1,61,586 | 2,58,341 | 3,00,517 | 3,07,522 |
| Interest expended | 55,744 | 74,743 | 1,49,808 | 1,77,847 | 1,78,836 |
| Net interest income | 72,009 | 86,843 | 1,08,533 | 1,22,670 | 1,28,686 |
| NII growth | n/a | 20.6% | 25.0% | 13.0% | 4.9% |
| Other income | 29,510 | 31,215 | 49,241 | 45,632 | 62,533 |
| Net revenue | 1,01,519 | 1,18,058 | 1,57,774 | 1,68,302 | 1,91,219 |
| Operating expenses | ~37,442 | ~47,652 | ~63,386 | 68,180 | 72,660 |
| Cost-to-income | ~36.9% | ~40.4% | ~40.2% | 40.5% | 38.0% |
| Pre-provision operating profit | ~64,077 | ~70,406 | ~94,388 | 1,00,122 | 1,18,559 |
| Provisions & contingencies | ~15,062 | ~11,920 | ~23,492 | 11,649 | 23,389 |
| PBT | 49,015 | 58,485 | 70,895 | 88,478 | 95,169 |
| Tax rate | 25% | 25% | 14% | 24% | 22% |
| PAT (standalone) | 36,961 | 44,109 | 60,812 | 67,347 | 74,671 |
| PAT growth | 18.8% | 19.3% | 37.9% | 10.7% | 10.9% |
| PAT margin (PAT ÷ net revenue) | 36.4% | 37.4% | 38.5% | 40.0% | 39.0% |
| PAT consolidated (Screener, incl. minority) | 38,151 | 46,149 | 65,446 | 73,440 | 79,219 |
| EPS standalone (₹, bonus-adj.) | 33.33 | 39.53 | 40.02 | 44.01 | 48.51 |
| DPS (₹, bonus-adj.) | 7.75 | 9.50 | 9.75 | 11.00 | 15.50 |
| Payout | 23% | 24% | 24% | 25% | 32% |
FY22–FY24 opex/provision split is reconstructed from the bank's annual results and reconciles exactly to Screener's combined total; treat the split as approximate (~). FY26 consolidated PAT attributable to shareholders is ₹76,030 cr (press release); Screener's ₹79,219 cr includes minority interest.
Quarterly P&L: Q1 FY25 to Q1 FY27 (₹ cr)
| ₹ cr | Q1FY25 | Q2FY25 | Q3FY25 | Q4FY25 | Q1FY26 | Q2FY26 | Q3FY26 | Q4FY26 | Q1FY27 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| NII | 29,837 | 30,114 | 30,653 | 32,066 | 31,438 | 31,552 | 32,615 | 33,082 | 33,534 |
| NII YoY | 26.4%* | 10.0% | 7.7% | 10.3% | 5.4% | 4.8% | 6.4% | 3.2% | 6.7% |
| NIM, total assets | n/v | n/v | n/v | 3.54% (3.46% core) | 3.35% | 3.27% | 3.35% | 3.38% | 3.26% |
| Fees & commissions | 7,050 | 8,140 | 8,180 | 8,530 | 7,590 | 8,840 | 9,230 | 9,220 | 8,450 |
| FX & derivatives | 1,400 | 1,460 | 1,400 | 1,440 | 1,630 | 1,590 | 1,430 | 1,490 | 1,300 |
| Trading / MTM | 220 | 290 | 70 | 390 | 10,110† | 2,390 | 930 | 820 | 420 |
| Misc. incl. recoveries | 2,010 | 1,590 | 1,790 | 1,670 | 2,400 | 1,530 | 1,660 | 1,670 | 2,660 |
| Total other income | 10,668 | 11,483 | 11,454 | 12,028 | 21,730 | 14,350 | 13,254 | 13,199 | 12,822 |
| Opex | 16,620 | 16,890 | 17,110 | 17,560 | 17,430 | 17,980 | 18,770‡ | 18,480 | 18,190 |
| Cost-to-income | ~41.0% | ~40.6% | ~40.6% | 39.8% | 39.6% ex-gain | 39.2% | 39.2% core | 39.9% | 39.2% |
| PPOP | 23,885 | 24,707 | 24,997 | 26,534 | 35,738 | 27,922 | 27,099 | 27,801 | 28,166 |
| Provisions | 2,602 | 2,700 | 3,154 | 3,193 | 14,442§ | 3,500 | 2,840¶ | 2,610 | 3,060 |
| Credit cost (ann.) | n/v | n/v | n/v | n/v | 56 bp | 51 bp | 55 bp | 35 bp | 40 bp |
| PBT | 21,283 | 22,005 | 21,847 | 23,344 | 21,292 | 24,423 | 24,260 | 25,193 | 25,108 |
| PAT | 16,175 | 16,821 | 16,736 | 17,616 | 18,155 | 18,641 | 18,654 | 19,221 | 19,060 |
| PAT YoY | 35.3%* | 5.3% | 2.2% | 6.7% | 12.2% | 10.8% | 11.5% | 9.1% | 5.0% (adj. 9.8%) |
| PAT QoQ | −2.0% | 4.0% | −0.5% | 5.3% | 3.1% | 2.7% | 0.1% | 3.0% | −0.8% |
| EPS (₹, bonus-adj.) | 10.63 | 11.02 | 10.94 | 11.51 | 11.84 | 12.13 | 12.12 | 12.49 | 12.38 |
| Consolidated PAT (attributable) | n/v | n/v | n/v | n/v | 16,260 | 19,610 | 19,810 | 20,350 | 19,240 |
* Against a pre-merger base. † Includes ₹9,128 cr HDB IPO OFS gain. ‡ Includes ₹800 cr one-off New Labour Code charge (core ₹17,970 cr). § Includes ₹9,000 cr floating and ₹1,700 cr contingent provisions. ¶ Net of ₹1,040 cr contingent provision release. n/v = not verified this session. NIM, RoA and RoE are as reported by the bank on daily-average balances. They cannot be reproduced from period-end balance sheets, which spike at quarter-end (Jun-26 average deposits ₹30,115 bn vs ₹31,708 bn period-end). Q2 FY27 P&L: not yet reported; the board meets on 17 Oct 2026.
One-time items register
| Period | Item | ₹ cr | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 FY24 | Gain on sale of HDFC Credila stake (approx.) | ~7,341 | Other income spike (₹18,166 cr) |
| Q4 FY24 | Floating provisions; staff ex-gratia; tax write-back (tax rate −5%) | ~10,900 / ~1,500 | Offsets the Credila gain |
| Q4 FY25 | Interest on income-tax refund | ~700 | NIM 3.54% reported vs 3.46% core |
| Q1 FY26 | HDB Financial IPO OFS gain | 9,128 | Trading income |
| Q1 FY26 | Floating provisions + additional contingent provisions | 9,000 + 1,700 | Provisions ₹14,442 cr; tax rate 15% (tax credit). Adjusted PAT ₹17,370 cr vs ₹18,155 cr reported |
| Q3 FY26 | Contingent provision release (large borrower group) | (1,040) | Lower provisions |
| Q3 FY26 | New Labour Code employee-benefit charge | 800 | Higher opex |
Growth decomposition and margin analysis
- Organic vs inorganic. FY24 growth (NII +25%, PAT +38%) was inorganic (merger plus a low tax rate). FY25–FY26 is organic: NII +13% and +4.9%; PAT +10.7% and +10.9%.
- Volume vs price. In Q1 FY27 advances grew +15.4% while NII grew only +6.7%. The gap is margin compression: yield on assets fell ~70 bp from Q4 FY25 to Q1 FY27 (8.4% → 7.7%) while cost of funds fell only ~50 bp (4.9% → 4.4%). The cause was 125 bp of repo cuts in 2025 transmitting to EBLR loans faster than to term deposits.
- Operating leverage is real. Opex grew only +4.3% YoY in Q1 FY27, and headcount fell by ~5,900. Core cost-to-income went from 40.5% (FY25) to 39.2%.
- Credit costs are benign. 35–56 bp across FY26–Q1 FY27 (21–41 bp net of recoveries). Provisions are not the earnings swing factor; NIM is.
- Core vs reported profit. FY26 reported PAT included the ₹9,128 cr HDB gain, but that was fully offset by ₹10,700 cr of floating and contingent provisions. Core earnings were therefore not flattered.
- Provision coverage. Specific PCR slipped to 66% (from ~70%+ historically, 70% ex-agri). This is a mild flag.
- Allegations of mis-statement. The US class action alleges that the ~₹45 cr MSRDC inducements, booked as marketing, overstated NII/NIM and opex over Jul 2023–May 2026. The amount is ~0.03% of FY26 NII (₹1,28,686 cr), so it is immaterial to the numbers. The issue is control quality, not earnings quality. [Analyst View]
Financials: Balance Sheet, Liquidity, Capital & Ratios
Five-year balance sheet (₹ cr)
| ₹ cr | FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | Jun-26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total assets | 20,68,535 | 24,66,081 | 36,17,623 | 39,10,199 | 43,64,886 | 43,97,500 |
| Deposits | 15,59,217 | 18,83,395 | 23,79,786 | 27,14,715 | 31,05,250 | 31,70,800 |
| Deposit growth | 16.8% | 20.8% | 26.4% | 14.1% | 14.4% | 14.7% |
| CASA ratio (EOP) | ~48% | ~44% | 38% | 34.8% | 34.1% | 32.3% |
| Gross advances | n/v | n/v | n/v | ~26,42,900 | 29,60,000 | 30,60,800 |
| Net advances | ~13,68,800 | ~16,00,600 | ~24,84,900 | ~26,19,600 | 29,37,200 | 30,37,300 |
| CD ratio (net adv/deposits) | ~87.8% | ~85.0% | ~104.4% | ~96.5% | 94.6% | 95.8% |
| Investments | 4,55,536 | 5,17,001 | 7,02,415 | 8,36,360 | 8,84,201 | 9,19,400 |
| Borrowings | 1,84,817 | 2,06,766 | 6,62,153 | 5,47,931 | 4,89,395 | 4,61,800 |
| Borrowings % liabilities | n/v | n/v | 18% | 14% | 11% | 11% |
| Net worth | 2,40,093 | 2,80,199 | 4,40,246 | 5,01,424 | 5,62,901 | 5,83,100 |
| Fixed assets | 6,084 | 8,017 | 11,399 | 13,655 | 14,725 | n/a |
| Goodwill | Not Available: not separately disclosed in the data sources accessed (FY26 annual report not parseable) | |||||
~ = recalled from published annual results, not re-fetched; approximate. Sep-26 provisional: deposits ₹33,27,500 cr, gross advances ₹32,19,500 cr, CASA ₹10,52,000 cr (31.6%), TDs ₹22,75,500 cr.
The LDR normalisation path after the merger
| Date | LDR / CD ratio | What management said |
|---|---|---|
| Jul 2023 (merger) | ~110% | Bring it back towards pre-merger levels over time |
| Mar 2024 | ~104% | FY25 loan growth to be kept below deposit growth |
| Mar 2025 | ~96–97% | "CD ratio to keep falling, not as steep" (Apr 2025) |
| Oct 2025 | ~98.8% gross [calc] | CFO: "strategic objective is to bring the LDR below 90, aiming for 85 to 90" |
| Dec 2025 | 98.7% (mgmt-reported); 99.5% gross [calc] | "~90%" on an annual glide path; securitisation a "strategic objective" |
| Mar 2026 | 94.6% (net) | CEO: "The loan deposit ratio is not a constraint." The <90 language was dropped |
| Jun 2026 | 95.8% (net) | FCNR(B) "should also enable" LDR reduction |
| Sep 2026 | ~96.8% gross [calc] | Deposits +18.8% vs advances +16.3%, helped by US$11.5 bn of FCNR(B) |
Funding mix detail
| ₹ bn | Mar-25 | Jun-25 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | Mar-26 | Jun-26 | Sep-26 (prov.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EOP deposits | 27,147 | 27,641 | 28,018 | 28,601 | 31,053 | 31,708 | 33,275 |
| Average deposits | 25,280 | 26,576 | 27,105 | 27,524 | 28,511 | 30,115 | 31,665 |
| Average deposit growth YoY | 15.9% | 16.4% | 15.1% | 12.2% | 12.8% | 13.3% | 16.8% |
| Average CASA | 8,289 | 8,604 | 8,770 | 8,984 | 9,184 | 9,570 | 9,712 |
| EOP CASA ratio | 34.8% | 33.9% | 33.9% | 33.6% | 34.1% | 32.3% | ~31.6% |
| Retail : wholesale deposits | 83:17 | 82:18 | n/a | n/a | 82:18 | 80:20 | n/a |
| Gross advances | ~26,430 | 26,532 | 27,692 | 28,446 | 29,600 | 30,608 | 32,195 |
Long-term debt maturities [US GAAP]: FY27 ₹1,216 bn; FY28 ₹394 bn; FY29 ₹732 bn; FY30 ₹401 bn; FY31 ₹580 bn; thereafter ₹1,649 bn. Management cites ₹40–50k cr of high-cost bonds maturing over two years. Replacing ~7%+ borrowings with ~6% retail TDs saves 100–125 bp on that slice, and the overall cost-of-funds opportunity is 40–50 bp. Issuance and calls in 2026:
- The board approved up to ₹60,000 cr of AT1/Tier 2/long-term bonds (Apr 2026).
- US$2.5 bn of senior unsecured USD bonds were issued (Jun–Aug 2026).
- The US$1 bn 3.7% AT1 was called on 25 Aug 2026.
- An INR AT1 was called on 30 Sep 2026.
Asset quality
| Mar-24 | Jun-25 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | Mar-26 | Jun-26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GNPA % | 1.24 | 1.40 | 1.24 | 1.24 | 1.15 | 1.17 |
| GNPA ex-agri % | n/a | 1.14 | 0.99 | 0.97 | 0.91 | 0.91 |
| NNPA % | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.41 |
| Specific PCR | n/a | 67% | 67% | 66% | 67% | 66% (70% ex-agri) |
| Floating provisions (₹ bn) | n/a | 214 | 214 | 214 | 214 | 214 |
| Contingent provisions (₹ bn) | n/a | 152 | 167 | 157 | 157 | 156 |
| General (standard) provisions (₹ bn) | n/a | 106 | 113 | 115 | 115 | 119 |
| Specific provisions (₹ bn) [calc: total − floating − contingent − general] | n/a | 248 | 228 | 232 | 229 | 235 |
| Total provisions (₹ bn) | n/a | 720 | 722 | 718 | 715 | 724 |
Q1 FY27 GNPA movement: opening ₹341 bn + slippages ₹80 bn (₹61 bn ex-agri; agri is seasonal in Q1) − upgrades/recoveries ₹40 bn − write-offs ₹23 bn = ₹358 bn. Annualised slippage ratio ~1.0–1.1% [Est.]. Floating plus contingent buffers of ~₹370 bn (~1.2% of loans; "almost 125 bp" per the CEO) are the ECL cushion.
Capital, liquidity and returns
| FY22 | FY23 | FY24 | FY25 | FY26 | Jun-26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRAR | 18.9% | 19.3% | 18.8% | 19.6% | 19.7% | 19.6% |
| Tier 1 | n/v | n/v | n/v | 17.7% | 17.7% | 17.8% |
| CET1 | 16.7% | 16.4% | 16.3% | 17.2% | 17.3% | 17.4% |
| RoA | 2.0% | 2.1% | 2.0% | 1.9% | 1.94% | 1.85% |
| RoE | 16.9% | 17.4% | 16.1% | 14.6% | 14.3% | 13.8% |
| BVPS standalone (₹, bonus-adj.) | ~216 | ~252 | 290 | 328 | 366 | 379 |
| Liquidity | Q4FY25 | Q1FY26 | Q2FY26 | Q3FY26 | Q4FY26 | Q1FY27 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average LCR | 119% | 124% | 120% | 116% | 114% | 115% |
| NSFR | 120% | 118% | 115% | 115% | 118% | 119% |
Management's LCR band is 110–120%, and the bank sits at the low end. System LCR is 126.7% and SBI's is 126%. Revised LCR norms (from 1 Apr 2026) add a 2.5% run-off on internet/mobile-enabled retail deposits. RWA was ₹30,520 bn at Jun-26 (risk density ~69% of total assets). The regulatory minimum CRAR including the D-SIB surcharge is 11.9% (per bank disclosure).
Credit ratings
| Agency | Instrument | Rating | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| India Ratings (17 Mar 2026) | Issuer; infra bonds ₹200 bn; Tier 2 ₹250 bn; CDs ₹1,500 bn; AT1 ₹150 bn | IND AAA/Stable; AAA; AAA; A1+; AA+ | [Fact] 6-K 18 Mar 2026 |
| CRISIL, ICRA, CARE | Long-term bonds / CDs | AAA/Stable; A1+ | [Not re-verified this session] |
| S&P Global (Aug 2025) | Issuer credit rating | BBB/Stable/A-2 (upgraded from BBB−/Positive/A-3 after India's sovereign upgrade; capped by the sovereign) | [Fact] S&P action, Aug 2025 (via FilingReader summary) |
| Moody's (Aug 2026) | US$1.75 bn fixed-rate senior notes due 2029 and 2031 | Baa3/Stable (S&P BBB on the same notes) | [Fact] bank disclosure of 20 Aug 2026 (via Investywise summary; 6-K not read directly) |
Equity dilution and share-count history
FY22 555 cr → FY23 558 cr → FY24 760 cr (merger issue to HDFC Ltd holders at a 42:25 swap; 1,164.6 mn HDFC Ltd-held bank shares cancelled) → FY25 765 cr → FY26 1,539 cr (1:1 bonus, Aug 2025, not dilutive). ESOP creep runs at ~0.65% a year (average shares 15.30 bn in Q4 FY25 → 15.40 bn in Q1 FY27). There has been no QIP or preferential issue since FY19. Bagchi's package adds RSUs/ESOPs (immaterial to dilution).
Management, Promoters & Governance
- a deposit-rate workaround was approved at senior levels (MSRDC);
- the board's ₹1 lakh token penalties drew RBI questions;
- the chairman left on ethics grounds, and his concerns were reviewed only by a company-commissioned process;
- the Dubai branch was barred from onboarding new clients;
- a US class action is pending.
Key management
| Name | Role | Background | Tenure / status | FY26 pay |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Anup Bagchi | MD & CEO-designate | B.Tech IIT Kanpur; PGDM IIM Bangalore. ICICI Group since 1992; MD & CEO ICICI Securities; ED ICICI Bank 2017–23 (retail, rural, business banking, then wholesale); MD & CEO ICICI Prudential Life from Jun 2023 (FY25 APE ₹10,407 cr, +15%) | RBI approval 1 Oct 2026; additional director 2 Oct; term 27 Oct 2026–26 Oct 2029. Postal-ballot e-voting 8 Oct–6 Nov 2026. First external CEO in the bank's history | Proposed: fixed ~₹8.97 cr + variable up to ₹26.92 cr (mostly share-linked) + ₹7.35 cr joining bonus; India's highest-paid bank CEO |
| Sashidhar Jagdishan | MD & CEO (outgoing) | Joined 1996 (Finance); CFO 2008–2020; CEO from 27 Oct 2020; CA, M.Sc. (Sheffield). Led the HDFC Ltd merger | Declined a third term on 29 Aug 2026; retires at close of 26 Oct 2026. Named defendant in the US class action; fined ₹1 lakh (MSRDC) | ₹15.13 cr (fixed 7.84 + variable 7.29) + 4.28 lakh ESOPs |
| Kaizad Bharucha | Deputy MD | Joined 1995; heads wholesale and retail businesses | RBI reappointed him 20 Jan 2026 to 18 Apr 2029. Was the internal CEO candidate; hits the RBI 15-year WTD cap ~2029. Retention risk | ₹17.14 cr (highest paid) |
| V. Srinivasa Rangan | Executive Director | Ex-ED & CFO, HDFC Ltd | ED since 23 Nov 2023 | ~₹11.28 cr |
| Bhavesh Zaveri | Executive Director (ceased) | Joined 1998; operations, IT, ATMs | Retired 18 Apr 2026 at his own request | ₹7.12 cr |
| Srinivasan Vaidyanathan | CFO (outgoing) | CFO since 2020; ex-Citi | Retiring; named in the US class action; fined ₹1 lakh (MSRDC) | n/a |
| Puneet Sharma | CFO-designate | CA; CFO Axis Bank Mar 2020–Aug 2026; ex-Tata Capital, Citibank | Joined 1 Sep 2026; full charge 1 Dec 2026 | n/a |
| V.N. Srivatsan | Chief Compliance Officer (incoming) | Ex-Head Compliance (Overseas & Subsidiaries), ICICI Bank | Joins 4 Jan 2027; Venkateswaran L is interim CCO (Rakesh Rajput's term ended 30 Sep 2026) | n/a |
| Jigar Shah | Group General Counsel | n/a | From 1 Oct 2026 (Sudhir Jha retired 30 Sep 2026) | n/a |
| Arvind Vohra | Group Head – Retail Assets | n/a | Fined ₹1 lakh plus warning letter (MSRDC, Jul 2026); still in role | n/a |
| Vibhash Naik | CHRO | n/a | From 1 Feb 2026 | n/a |
| Ajay Agarwal | Company Secretary | n/a | Unchanged | n/a |
Board of directors
| Name | Role | Category | Since | Background |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rajiv Kumar | Part-time Chairman | Independent | ID 30 Jun 2026; Chair 15 Jul 2026 (3 yrs) | 1984-batch IAS; ex-Finance Secretary; ex-Chief Election Commissioner |
| Sashidhar Jagdishan | MD & CEO | Executive | Oct 2020 (to 26 Oct 2026) | Bank lifer |
| Anup Bagchi | Additional Director → MD & CEO | Executive | 2 Oct 2026 | Ex-ICICI |
| Kaizad Bharucha | Deputy MD | Executive | DMD 19 Apr 2023 | Wholesale/retail |
| V. Srinivasa Rangan | ED | Executive | Nov 2023 | Ex-HDFC Ltd CFO |
| Keki Mistry | Director (interim chair 19 Mar–14 Jul 2026) | Non-exec, non-independent | Post-merger | Ex-VC & CEO, HDFC Ltd |
| M.D. Ranganath* | Director | Independent | ~2019 | Ex-CFO, Infosys |
| Sandeep Parekh* | Director | Independent | ~2020 | Securities lawyer; ex-SEBI ED |
| Dr. Sunita Maheshwari* | Director | Independent | ~2019 | Founder, Telerad |
| Lily Vadera* | Director | Independent | ~2021 | Ex-RBI ED |
| Umesh Chandra Sarangi* | Director | Independent | ~2021 | Ex-Chairman NABARD; ex-IAS |
| Dr. Harsh Kumar Bhanwala* | Director | Independent | ~2023 | Ex-Chairman NABARD |
| Santhosh Iyengar Keshavan* | Director | Independent | ~2023 | Technology executive |
| Atanu Chakraborty | Chairman (ceased 18 Mar 2026) | Independent | May 2021 | 1985-batch IAS; ex-DEA Secretary |
*Board composition carried from FY24–FY25 disclosures; not re-verified against the FY26 annual report (the PDF was not parseable this session). Verify before relying on it. Committees: Audit; Group Nomination & Remuneration (GNRC); Risk; CSR & ESG; plus a Special Disciplinary Committee of Independent Directors set up in Jul 2026 for MSRDC.
2026 governance timeline
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 26 Sep 2025 | DFSA bars the DIFC (Dubai) branch from onboarding new clients and from advising, arranging or promoting to them. Linked in the press to Credit Suisse AT1 sales to NRIs (est. US$100–120 mn exposure). Not lifted as of Oct 2026 |
| 9 Mar 2026 | GNRC acts on the AT1 matter: action against 15 executives, 3 removed (incl. Group Head Branch Banking per CNBC-TV18) |
| 12 Mar 2026 | Audit Committee orders a vigilance probe into marketing-budget payments linked to MSRDC deposits |
| 18 Mar 2026 | Chairman Atanu Chakraborty resigns: "certain happenings and practices… over the last two years… not in congruence with my personal values and ethics." ADS −3% to −7% (sources differ); ~US$21 bn of value lost (Gulf News) |
| 19 Mar 2026 | RBI: "no material concerns"; Keki Mistry approved as interim chairman for 3 months |
| 10 Apr 2026 | MSRDC vigilance findings to the Audit Committee: 10+ senior officials responsible "in varying capacities", reportedly including the CEO |
| 5 May 2026 | Bombay HC quashes the Lilavati Trust FIRs against Jagdishan ("personal vendetta writ large") |
| 27 May 2026 | Indian Express reports ~₹45 cr of "differential interest" to MSRDC (~6.01% effective vs ~3.5% SA rate; 2017 and 2021) routed via marketing/road-safety sponsorships. ADS −4.1% to US$23.78 |
| 29 May 2026 | Supreme Court issues notice on the Trust's challenge; allows a limited probe on personal benefit to specific individuals |
| 26 Jun 2026 | External review (Wilson Sonsini; Wadia Ghandy) finds the chairman's statement "not substantiated". He declined to be interviewed and called it "an exercise in futility" |
| 29 Jun / 15 Jul 2026 | Rajiv Kumar named chairman; RBI approval 15 Jul. Puneet Sharma named CFO-designate |
| 23 Jul 2026 | Special Disciplinary Committee: MSRDC was "business overreach", not mala fide; "potential divergence" from RBI directions. ₹1 lakh fine plus warning letter to the CEO, CFO and Arvind Vohra. The board dates the ~₹45 cr payments to FY24–FY25, booked as marketing expense (Moneylife, 27 Jul 2026); this differs from the 2017/2021 dates in the 27 May press report |
| Jul–Aug 2026 | RBI asks how the fines were set and for precedents; brings forward its supervisory review of MSRDC |
| 13 Aug 2026 | US securities class action filed in SDNY (Soneji v. HDFC Bank et al.); class period 17 Jul 2023–26 May 2026; lead-plaintiff deadline 13 Oct 2026 |
| 29 Aug 2026 | Jagdishan declines reappointment despite the board's persuasion; no reason given |
| 12 Sep 2026 | Board sends two names to the RBI (Bharucha and an external candidate) |
| 30 Sep–2 Oct 2026 | CCO and GC changes; RBI approves Bagchi (1 Oct) |
Shareholding pattern
| % | Jun-25 | Sep-25 | Dec-25 | Mar-26 | Jun-26 | Sep-26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Promoter | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| FII / FPI (incl. ADR) | 48.84 | 48.38 | 47.67 | 44.05 | 41.82 | 39.39 |
| DII total | 35.77 | 36.07 | 37.00 | 40.14 | 41.75 | 43.44 |
| – of which mutual funds | n/a | 26.02 | 26.66 | 29.54 | 30.62 | 31.88 |
| Government | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.19 |
| Public / retail | 15.19 | 15.33 | 15.11 | 15.64 | 16.27 | 16.96 |
| No. of shareholders (lakh) | 37.3 | 37.0 | 36.5 | 42.3 | 45.3 | 48.1 |
Major holders:
- LIC: 4.11% (14 Aug 2026). The RBI letter of 19 Aug 2026 allows it to go up to 9.99%.
- SBI MF: ~6.4% (Simply Wall St, undated; verify).
- Domestic MFs: bought ~₹17,250 cr in the March 2026 sell-off.
Other ownership points:
- Pledge: not applicable (no promoter).
- Insider/SAST: no material open-market KMP dealings found; activity limited to ESOP exercises. The trading window is closed 24 Sep–19 Oct 2026.
- Foreign headroom: the aggregate foreign limit is 74%, so headroom is now ample. The MSCI foreign-inclusion constraint that capped the weight in 2024 is effectively gone. No 2026 MSCI/FTSE weight change was found.
Litigation and regulatory register
| Matter | Status (12 Oct 2026) | Exposure |
|---|---|---|
| US class action (SDNY), s.10(b)/20(a) | Lead-plaintiff deadline 13 Oct 2026; the bank calls it "without merit" | Not quantified. A 2020 EDNY class action (vehicle loans) is precedent |
| RBI supervisory review of MSRDC | Advanced; outcome pending | Possible penalty, malus/clawback, or observations |
| Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Jagdishan (alleged ₹2.05 cr) | FIRs quashed by Bombay HC (5 May 2026); SC notice (29 May 2026); pending | Personal to the ex-CEO after 26 Oct; it originated from the bank's recovery of ₹65 cr+ dues from Mehta-family entities |
| DFSA restriction, DIFC branch | In force since 26 Sep 2025 | Immaterial financially (overseas advances 1.6%) |
| Credit Suisse AT1 / Carisel (Dubai, Bahrain) | The bank won 7 investor AT1 cases in Bahrain; NCDRC (23 Mar 2026) held complainants were not retail/uninformed; 75+ HNIs allege Carisel losses (~US$13.5 mn, Aug 2026) | Reputational |
| RBI / SEBI actions | Amount | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| RBI, Jan 2020 | ₹1 cr | KYC (current accounts used for IPO bidding) |
| RBI, Dec 2020 | Business restriction | Outages: ban on new digital launches and cards (lifted Aug 2021 / Mar 2022) |
| RBI, May 2021 | ₹10 cr | Auto-loan unit forced sale of GPS devices |
| RBI, Sep 2024 | ₹1 cr | Deposit interest-rate directions, recovery agents, customer service |
| SEBI, Dec 2024 | Warning letter | Merchant-banker / banker-to-issue compliance |
| RBI, Mar 2025 | ₹75 lakh | KYC (risk categorisation; multiple customer IDs) |
| RBI, 18 Nov 2025 | ₹91 lakh | Multiple benchmarks in one loan category; KYC outsourcing; subsidiary doing impermissible business (ISE 2024) |
| RBI, 2026 | None found | MSRDC review pending |
Auditors and related parties
Joint statutory auditors: Batliboi & Purohit (FRN 101048W) were appointed for FY25–FY27, replacing M M Nissim & Co LLP, which rotated out; RBI approval is required each year [Fact, 6-K Jun 2024 AGM notice]. Price Waterhouse LLP (FRN 301112E/E300264) was the other joint auditor and was in the 3rd and final year of its term in FY25 (RBI FY25 approved-auditor list). The second joint auditor for FY26/FY27: Not Available, because the FY26 annual report could not be parsed. Banks above ₹15,000 cr of assets must have joint auditors with 3-year terms. No qualification or emphasis of matter was reported for FY26. The internal audit of the marketing function rated controls "unsatisfactory", and that triggered the MSRDC probe. The chief internal auditor and the former compliance head exited in 2025–26 in connection with the Dubai matter (per the ex-chairman).
Related parties: there is no promoter, so there is no promoter-RPT risk. Shareholders approve material RPTs annually with HDFC Life, HDFC ERGO, HDFC Securities, HDB Financial and HDFC Credila: deposits, PTC/securitisation purchases, distribution fees and insurance premia. FY26 amounts by counterparty: Not Available. In Apr 2026 the board approved up to ₹1,000 cr of investment in HDFC Life's preferential issue.
Subsidiaries and group structure
| Entity | Stake (Jun-26) | Business | Latest | Mkt cap 12 Oct 2026 | Bank's share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HDFC Life Insurance | 50.54% | Life insurance | Q1 FY27 PAT ₹611 cr (+12%); VNB ₹879 cr; margin 25.6%; EV ₹65,900 cr; solvency 185%; FY26 PAT ₹1,912 cr | ₹1,21,632 cr (₹560) | ₹61,473 cr |
| HDFC AMC | 52.34% | Mutual fund (11.2% QAAUM share) | Q1 FY27 PAT ~₹837 cr (+12%); QAAUM ₹9.4 lakh cr; FY26 PAT ₹2,858 cr | ₹98,275 cr (₹2,290) | ₹51,437 cr |
| HDB Financial Services | 74.12% | NBFC: consumer, enterprise, asset finance | Q1 FY27 PAT ₹785 cr (+38%); AUM ₹1.22 lakh cr (+11.4%); GS3 2.34%; RoE 15%; FY26 PAT ₹2,544 cr | ₹49,017 cr (₹590; 52w ₹797/555) | ₹36,331 cr |
| HDFC ERGO General | 50.24% | General insurance (JV with ERGO/Munich Re) | Q1 FY27 PAT ₹220 cr; GWP ₹4,300 cr (+18%); FY26 PAT ₹810 cr | Unlisted | — |
| HDFC Securities | 93.99% | Broking | Q1 FY27 PAT ₹300 cr (+28%); FY26 PAT ₹930 cr | Unlisted | — |
| HDFC Capital Advisors | 89.7% (Mar-26) | Real-estate / affordable-housing PE (H-CARE) | n/a | Unlisted | — |
| HDFC Credila | 9.99% | Education loans; ~90% sold in FY24 | Not a subsidiary | — | — |
| Others | 100% | HDFC Sales, HDFC Trustee, Griha Investments (Mauritius), Griha Pte (Singapore); HDFC Pension via HDFC Life | n/a | — | — |
| Listed subsidiaries | ₹1,49,241 cr (≈₹97/share, pre-discount) [Est.] |
Additional notes on the group:
- HDB IPO: ₹12,500 cr [Fact; S&P Aug-2025], comprising fresh ₹2,500 cr + OFS ₹10,000 cr by the bank at ₹740, subscribed 25–27 Jun 2025, listed 2 Jul 2025 [split, price and dates not re-fetched at QC]. The stake fell from ~94% to 74.12%, and the bank booked a ₹9,128 cr gain in Q1 FY26 (press release). The IPO was driven by RBI upper-layer NBFC listing rules. At ₹590 (52-week range ₹797/₹555, Screener), HDB trades ~20% below the reported ₹740 issue price.
- Overlap regulation: the RBI's Oct 2024 draft would have barred bank/group-entity business overlap. The final rules (Oct 2025) dropped the ban and now require only a board-approved policy. Forced HDB merger/sale risk is now low.
- Loss-making units: none material.
- Cross-holdings: HDFC Life and HDFC MF hold HDFC Bank shares through policyholder and scheme funds. In Jan–Feb 2025 the RBI allowed group entities to hold up to 9.5% in Kotak, AU SFB, Capital SFB, IndusInd and others as portfolio investments.
- Contribution: insurance was 29.8% of FY26 consolidated net revenue [US GAAP]. Consolidated PAT minus standalone is ~₹180 cr in Q1 FY27 (attributable basis).
- Acquisition track record: Times Bank (2000) and CBoP (2008) were successful. The HDFC Ltd merger (2023) is mixed: it brought scale and mortgage cross-sell, but also NIM dilution, the LDR overhang and a CASA ratio down 6–8 pp.
Funding & Supply Chain
↑ Upstream: what HDFC Bank depends on
| Input | Size / share | Cost / risk |
|---|---|---|
| Retail deposits (SA + retail TD) | 80% of deposits (Jun-26), down from 83% (Mar-25); SA ₹7.0 lakh cr | Cheapest stable funding; household deposit growth in the industry is only ~8–9%. Retail TD cost ~6%. Deposits under ₹3 cr were 47% of FY26 net TD accretion (31% in FY25) |
| Current accounts | ₹3.25 lakh cr (Jun-26); fell 8.5% QoQ | Zero-cost but volatile at quarter-ends |
| Wholesale deposits (corporates, government, PSUs, trusts) | 20% of deposits (17% a year ago) | Rate-sensitive and less sticky; the MSRDC episode shows the temptation to "buy" them |
| Term deposits | ₹22.76 lakh cr (Sep-26), +22.8% YoY | Main growth funder; reprices with a ~6-quarter lag |
| FCNR(B) (RBI swap window, 2026) | US$11.5 bn (~₹1.10 lakh cr) by 31 Aug 2026 | Hard-currency, rate-incentivised; future maturity/repricing wall. US$5.7 bn lent via overseas branches; US$3.1 bn SBLCs |
| Borrowings (legacy HDFC Ltd bonds, infra bonds, refinance, USD bonds) | ₹4.62 lakh cr; 11% of liabilities (industry 5–6%) | ~7%+ cost; ₹40–50k cr maturing over 2 years; FY27 LT-debt maturities ₹1.22 lakh cr [US GAAP] |
| Capital | Net worth ₹5.83 lakh cr; CET1 17.4% | Self-funded through ~₹76k cr annual profit |
| Technology | Multi-cloud landing zone, "Lighten the Core" decoupling, active-active for 14 critical apps, four tech "factories" | Core-banking vendor: Not Available in documents read (industry assumption Finacle, unverified). Outage history (2018–20) led to RBI curbs |
| Payment rails | NPCI (UPI, IMPS, RuPay, NACH, FASTag), RBI (NEFT/RTGS), Visa, Mastercard, Diners | Network/regulator-set economics; zero MDR on UPI |
| People | 2,12,958 employees; 14,392 BCs (mostly CSCs); DSAs (count Not Available) | Headcount down ~5,900 YoY; attrition and conduct risk |
Supplier concentration: low. Deposits are granular (80% retail), and top-20 depositor concentration is Not Available (FY26 Schedule 18 not parsed). Import / country dependence: none for core operations. FCNR(B) and USD bonds add FX funding (hedged via swaps). Cost pass-through: EBLR-linked retail/SME loans reprice within a quarter of repo changes; TDs reprice over ~6 quarters. That asymmetry hurt in the 2025 cut cycle and helps in the Oct 2026 hike.
↓ Downstream: who depends on HDFC Bank
| Customer group | Share of AUM | Products / stickiness |
|---|---|---|
| Home buyers (salaried / self-employed) | Mortgages 29% | 15–20-year tenor; EBLR-linked; commoditised pricing; sticky once disbursed |
| Retail borrowers | Retail assets 23% (PL ~30%, vehicles ~24%, agri ~17%, cards ~16%, other ~13%) | Short tenor; high yield; cross-sold to the salary/SA base |
| MSMEs and self-employed | Business banking 15% | Working capital renewed annually; CA/CMS float; fastest growing (+22%) |
| Transporters | CV/CE 6% | Cyclical; tied to freight |
| Corporates, NBFCs, PSUs | 27% | Thin spreads; relationship and CMS-driven; top-20 borrowers 10.2% of exposure |
| Farmers / rural (PSL) | Agri ₹1.24 lakh cr | Mandated (PSL 40% of ANBC); highest GNPA segment |
| Fee payers | Card spenders (~29.5% of India's card spends); merchants (35–36% of acquiring); buyers of insurance/MF; capital-market intermediaries (35–40% of settlements) | Annuity-like fee flows |
Customer concentration: low. The top-10 borrowers are 6.8% of exposure, the largest single borrower 1.1%. NBFCs are 5.6% of exposure (the largest non-retail industry). Consumer loans are 27.1%. Contract tenors: mortgages long, cards/PL short, corporate WC annual. Stickiness: salary accounts, CMS mandates and card/merchant ecosystems.
Value-chain map
Competitive Position
Peer comparison
| Metric | HDFC Bank | ICICI Bank | SBI | Kotak Mahindra | Axis Bank | IndusInd |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advances (₹ lakh cr) | 30.61 | 16.31 | 50.47 | 5.12 | 12.62 | 3.26 |
| Advances growth YoY | +15.4% | +19.6% | +18.6% | +15% | +19% | −2% |
| Deposits (₹ lakh cr) | 31.71 | 18.34 | 60.06 | 5.73 | 13.73 | 4.15 |
| Deposit growth YoY | +14.7% | +14.0% | +9.7% | +12% | +18% | +4% |
| LDR (adv ÷ dep) [calc] | 96.5% | 88.9% | 84.0% (dom. CD 74.2%) | 89.4% | 91.9% | 78.7% |
| NIM | 3.40% IEA (3.26% TA) | 4.36% | 2.86% | 4.53% | 3.46% | 3.57% |
| PAT (₹ cr) / YoY | 19,060 / +5.0% | 14,805 / +15.9% | 21,121 / +10.2% | 4,123 / +26% | 7,114 / +22.5% | 1,002 / +47% |
| Cost-to-income | 39.2% | 38.1%* | 46.7% | 45.6%* | 45.5%* | ~57%* |
| GNPA / NNPA | 1.17% / 0.41% | 1.38% / 0.35% | 1.47% / 0.38% | 1.18% / 0.27% | 1.28% / 0.39% | 3.25% / 0.95% |
| RoA | 1.85% | n/a | 1.11% | 2.14% | 1.51% | 0.78% |
| RoE | 13.8% | ~17% (unverified) | 17.9% | 12.0% | 14.2% | 6.3% |
| CASA ratio | 32.3% | 38.1% (avg) | 39.2% | 40.3% | 37–38% | 30% |
| CET1 / CRAR | 17.4% / 19.6% | 16.2% / 16.8% | n/a / 15.7% | 22.4% / 22.8% | 14.6% / 16.7% | 16.1% / 17.2% |
| LCR | 115% | n/a | 126% | n/a | 119% | n/a |
| Branches | 9,694 | 7,608 | n/a | n/a | 6,295 | n/a |
| Price (₹) | 708 | 1,338 | 942 | 442 | 1,249 | 853 |
| Market cap (₹ cr) | 10,91,097 | 9,60,267 | 8,69,123 | 4,39,249 | 3,89,019 | 66,453 |
| P/B (standalone) | 1.87x | 2.74x | 1.53x | 3.25x | 1.83x | 1.02x |
| P/E (TTM) | 14.4x | 18.4x | 10.6x* | 29.6x | 15.1x | ~53x |
| Moat | Distribution + cards + subsidiaries + cost; funding moat impaired | Execution and RoE leader | Sovereign deposit franchise, scale | Capital and CASA fortress | Cards (Citi), corporate | Turnaround; governance-scarred |
*Derived from reported components. Kotak P/B is on standalone BV (2.34x on consolidated). Sources: company Q1 FY27 releases/presentations, Screener (12 Oct 2026).
Market position and share
| Item | HDFC Bank | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Rank | #1 private bank; #2 bank by assets (₹43.98 lakh cr) after SBI (₹76.62 lakh cr); #1 Indian bank by market cap | The m-cap lead over ICICI has narrowed to ~14% |
| Share of system deposits | ~11.5–12.0% [calc] | SCB deposits ₹276.2 lakh cr (15 Sep 2026) |
| Share of system advances | ~13.7–14.4% [calc] | SCB credit ₹223.3 lakh cr |
| Credit cards outstanding | #1, ~22.0% (2.67 crore cards, Jun-26) | SBI Card 18.6%, ICICI 16.1%, Axis 13.3% |
| Card spends | #1, ~29.5% (₹59,433 cr in Jun-26); Jul-26 spends +11.9% YoY | ICICI spends −5.9% YoY in Jul-26 |
| Merchant acquiring / capital-market settlements / exports | 35–36% / 35–40% / 18–20% (mgmt) | Fee moat |
| Mortgages | ₹9.0 lakh cr book, +6.8% | Share: Not Available. Growth well below system implies share loss |
Strengths and weaknesses versus each peer
| Peer | HDFC stronger on | HDFC weaker on |
|---|---|---|
| ICICI Bank | Scale (1.9x advances), branches, cards #1, CET1 17.4% vs 16.2%, GNPA, listed-subsidiary depth | NIM ~96 bp lower; PAT growth 5% vs 16%; CASA 32% vs 38%; LDR 96.5% vs 88.9%; P/B 1.87x vs 2.74x; governance. ICICI also supplied HDFC's new CEO |
| SBI | RoA 1.85% vs 1.11%; NIM; C/I 39% vs 47%; no state ownership | SBI 1.65x larger; CASA 39%; domestic CD ratio 74% gives far more room; RoE 17.9% (leverage); cheaper valuation |
| Kotak | ~6x scale; C/I; RoE; much cheaper multiple | Kotak NIM 4.53%, CASA 40%, CET1 22.4%, RoA 2.14% |
| Axis | C/I, RoA, CET1, GNPA, cards rank | Axis growing faster with higher CASA and lower LDR; similar P/B |
| IndusInd | Every quality metric | IndusInd's 2025 governance/accounting crisis is a cautionary analogue for how fast trust can erode |
Industry structure and Porter's five forces
The top five banks (SBI, HDFC, ICICI, Axis, Kotak) hold ~45–50% of system deposits [Est.]: a concentrated top with a fragmented tail of PSU banks, SFBs and NBFC competitors. System credit is growing +18.1% and deposits +17.3% (15 Sep 2026). The deposit surge was boosted by US$119 bn of NRI inflows in Apr–Aug 2026 after the June capital-flow measures. System health (Jun-26): GNPA 1.67%, NIM 3.22%, RoE 13.26%, LCR 126.7%. Policy:
- Repo hiked 25 bp to 5.50% on 7 Oct 2026, with the stance moved to "calibrated tightening". The 2025 cuts took repo from 6.50% to 5.25%.
- ECL from 1 Apr 2027, with the Day-1 impact spread over FY28–31.
- Revised LCR norms since 1 Apr 2026.
- The overlap ban was dropped in Oct 2025.
- PSL requirement is 40% of ANBC.
| Force | Intensity | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Rivalry | High | Deposit-rate war; ICICI and Axis growing faster; SBI guiding 13–15% credit growth |
| Supplier power (depositors) | High | TD +17–23% vs CASA +9–11%; wholesale share rising; the rate-hike cycle adds pressure |
| Buyer power (borrowers) | Med-High | Corporates and prime mortgage borrowers are rate-sensitive; unsecured/SME less so |
| Substitutes | Medium | MFs/equities for savings; NBFCs/HFCs/bonds for credit; UPI apps for payments |
| New entrants | Low-Med | Licensing, capital, D-SIB surcharge and branch density; threats come from SFB conversions and fintech niches |
Risks & Red Flags
| # | Risk | Category | Severity | Detailed explanation | Mitigant |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Governance / conduct ("tone at the top") | Governance | High | Chairman resigned on ethics grounds (18 Mar 2026). MSRDC: ~₹45 cr of deposit inducements booked as marketing; the board called it "business overreach" with ₹1 lakh fines. DFSA curbs; AT1 mis-selling exits (15 executives actioned). | New independent chairman; external legal review; RBI "no material concerns" (19 Mar); entire top team being replaced |
| 2 | RBI supervisory outcome on MSRDC | Regulatory | High | The RBI questioned the basis of the ₹1 lakh penalties and advanced its review. Possible outcomes: monetary penalty, malus/clawback on variable pay, business observations or restrictions (cf. the 2020 digital ban). | Financially immaterial amount; leadership change already under way |
| 3 | CEO and C-suite transition | Execution | High | First external CEO (from 27 Oct). New CFO (1 Dec), new CCO (4 Jan 2027), new GC (1 Oct). Deputy MD Bharucha passed over. Risk of a "kitchen-sink" quarter, guidance reset and senior attrition. | Bagchi's ICICI retail-liability record; RBI-vetted; share-linked pay |
| 4 | Funding: high LDR, CASA erosion | Financial | High | Gross LDR ~96.8% (Sep-26), the highest among large peers. CASA 31.6% (vs ~44% at Mar-23, pre-merger; 38–40% is the medium-term target). TDs +22.8%; wholesale deposits 20%; FCNR US$11.5 bn. | Deposits growing faster than loans (+18.8% vs +16.3%); LCR 115%; NSFR 119% |
| 5 | NIM compression / no recovery | Financial / Macro | High | NIM 3.26% (record post-merger low). Yield −70 bp vs CoF −50 bp since Q4 FY25. Growth is skewed to thin-spread corporate. Repo hiked to 5.50% (7 Oct 2026): EBLR loans reprice up, but deposit competition intensifies. | ₹40–50k cr of high-cost bonds maturing; retail mix rebuild; EBLR repricing in a hike cycle |
| 6 | US securities class action (SDNY) | Legal | Med-High | Filed 13 Aug 2026; class period 17 Jul 2023–26 May 2026. Alleges overstated NII/NIM/opex and ineffective ICFR. Defendants: the bank, the CEO and the CFO. | The bank says it is "without merit"; the amount involved is small |
| 7 | FII outflow / ownership overhang | Market | Med-High | FII 48.8% → 39.4% in 15 months. FPIs pulled ~US$10.3 bn from India in FY27 to date. Nifty weight 10.27% makes it the main FPI liquidity source. | DII 43.4%; LIC can go to 9.99%; MSCI headroom now ample |
| 8 | Unsecured retail stress (cards, PL) | Business | Medium | PL ~₹2.19 lakh cr, cards ~₹1.17 lakh cr [Est.]. System card 90–179 dpd at 8.1% of balances (CIBIL, Mar-26). Inflation projected at 6% in Q3 FY27. | Deliberately slow growth; credit cost 40 bp; ₹72,400 cr provision stock |
| 9 | Agri / El Niño asset quality | Business / Macro | Medium | Agri is the main GNPA driver (1.17% headline vs 0.91% ex-agri). Q1 slippages ₹80 bn, of which ~₹19 bn agri. Management flagged weather risk for Q3 FY27. | Seasonal recoveries; PSL-backed |
| 10 | DFSA / overseas conduct (AT1, Carisel) | Regulatory | Medium | DIFC new-client ban since 26 Sep 2025. AT1 exposure US$100–120 mn; Carisel ~US$13.5 mn. | Overseas advances only 1.6%; Bahrain cases won |
| 11 | Mortgage and retail share loss | Business | Medium | Mortgages +6.8% vs SBI home loans +12.75%; retail +7.2% vs ICICI +12%, SBI +15%. | Pricing discipline; disbursements +14% |
| 12 | FCNR(B) maturity / repricing wall | Financial / FX | Medium | US$11.5 bn of rate-incentivised NRI deposits will need rollover; FX-swap economics depend on RBI. | Matched partly by US$5.7 bn of overseas lending |
| 13 | PSL compliance after the merger | Regulatory | Medium | The legacy HDFC Ltd book enlarged ANBC; shortfalls go to RIDF/PSLC at a yield drag. Quantified shortfall: Not Available. | Rural/semi-urban branches (50%); agri book |
| 14 | ECL transition (1 Apr 2027) | Regulatory | Low-Med | CRISIL: system net CET1 hit up to 120 bp; Stage 2 floor ~5%. PCR at 66%. | CET1 17.4%; ₹21,400 cr floating + ₹15,600 cr contingent provisions; Day-1 impact spread over FY28–31 |
| 15 | Technology outage / cyber | Execution / ESG | Medium | History of outages leading to the RBI's 2020 digital ban; core decoupling programme under way. No 2025–26 RBI IT action found. | Active-active for 14 critical apps; multi-cloud |
| 16 | Lilavati Trust litigation | Governance / Legal | Low-Med | FIR quashed by the HC (5 May 2026); Supreme Court notice (29 May). Personal to the ex-CEO after 26 Oct. | Bank's recovery case is strong |
| 17 | Subsidiary-overlap regulation | Regulatory | Low | The draft ban was dropped in the final rules (Oct 2025). | Board-approved demarcation suffices |
| 18 | Capital / dilution | Financial | Low | No QIP needed; AT1 calls in Aug/Sep 2026 trim Tier 1 slightly. | ~₹76k cr annual accrual; CET1 17.4% |
| 19 | Tax disputes / contingent liabilities | Financial | Low-Med | Routine income-tax/GST orders, contested. No single 2026 demand above ₹1,000 cr found. Possible GST/ITC issue on MSRDC vendor invoices. ₹35 lakh cr of contingent liabilities is mostly derivative notional. | Provided where probable |
| 20 | Headcount cuts / culture | ESG / Execution | Low-Med | Employees −5,864 YoY (Jun-26); ~8,800 non-supervisory reduction in FY26; ~a dozen compliance/audit exits linked to Dubai. | Productivity; C/I 39.2% |
| 21 | MFI exposure | Business | Low | Not separately disclosed; small. | — |
Red-flag checklist
| Flag | Status |
|---|---|
| Rising debt | No Borrowings −₹0.48 lakh cr YoY to ₹4.62 lakh cr (11% of liabilities vs 21% in Sep-23) |
| Margin deterioration | Yes NIM 3.26% vs 3.38% QoQ; NII +6.7% vs advances +15% |
| Auditor concerns | None found But internal audit rated marketing controls "unsatisfactory", and the chief internal auditor exited |
| Related-party abuse | None found No promoter; MSRDC is a third-party matter |
| Promoter selling / pledge | N/A No promoter |
| Dilution | No Bonus is not dilutive; ESOP creep ~0.65% a year |
| Customer loss | Partial CASA and mortgage share loss; DIFC onboarding ban |
| Litigation / regulatory | Yes SDNY class action; RBI MSRDC review; SC Lilavati; DFSA |
| Rate / FX / commodity | Yes Repo hike to 5.50%; crude $116/bbl (Sep-26); FCNR wall |
| Key-person dependency | Yes CEO, CFO, CCO and GC all new by Jan 2027 |
Concall Highlights & Guidance
Quarter by quarter
| Quarter (date) | Headline numbers | Management in its own words | Analyst pushback | Tone |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q4 FY25 (19 Apr 2025) | PAT ₹17,616 cr (+6.7%); NII +10.3%; NIM 3.54% (3.46% core); advances +5.4% vs deposits +14.1%; GNPA 1.33%; DPS ₹22 (pre-bonus) | FY26 loan growth "in line with system", FY27 to "outpace system"; CD ratio to keep falling, "not as steep as last year"; CASA to improve with a lag | Not available (transcript paywalled) | Confident |
| Q1 FY26 (19 Jul 2025) | PAT ₹18,155 cr (+12.2%) incl. ₹9,128 cr HDB gain; ₹9,000 cr floating + ₹1,700 cr contingent provisions; NIM 3.35% (−19 bp QoQ); GNPA 1.40%. First-ever 1:1 bonus; ₹5 special dividend | Q2 FY26 could be the margin bottom if there are no further RBI cuts; TD repricing takes ~6 quarters | Size of provisions; margin path after 100 bp of front-loaded cuts | Confident |
| Q2 FY26 (18 Oct 2025) | PAT ₹18,641 cr (+10.8%); NII +4.8%; NIM 3.27%; deposits +12.1%; advances +9.9%; GNPA 1.24% | CFO Vaidyanathan: "Our strategic objective is to bring the LDR below 90, aiming for 85 to 90." "We plan to grow faster than the system in FY27, consuming capital." Exit margins to improve in a stable-rate scenario; CoF benefit over 4–5 quarters | Was the asset-quality improvement one-off (yes, an upgrade)? CoF falling slower than peers; deposits lag industry; tepid card book | Confident |
| Q3 FY26 (17 Jan 2026) | PAT ₹18,654 cr (+11.5%); NIM 3.35% (+8 bp); ₹1,040 cr contingent release; ₹800 cr Labour Code charge; LDR 98.7% (mgmt); 71 branches added | "Grow faster than system in FY27" maintained; LDR "~90%" on an annual glide path; securitisation a "strategic objective"; "the CD ratio is crucial for sustainable profitability" | LDR moving the wrong way; PL Capital: hitting the target needs 20%+ of incremental system deposits | Confident |
| Q4 FY26 (18 Apr 2026, a month after the chairman's exit) | PAT ₹19,221 cr (+9.1%); FY26 PAT ₹74,671 cr (+10.9%); NIM 3.38%; deposits +14.4%; CASA 34.1%; GNPA 1.15%; LCR 114%; DPS ₹13; ₹60,000 cr bond raise approved | Jagdishan: "The loan deposit ratio is not a constraint." Bharucha: geopolitics and oil "will determine our trajectory of the NIM"; rate cycle "currently paused"; focus on ROA, not NIM; LCR to be "between 110–120". No numeric FY27 guidance | Nuvama: FY27 drivers. MOSL: late-quarter deposit surge (wholesale). Citi: is above-system growth sustainable? Bernstein: success metric (answer: ROA, then EPS). HSBC: weak third-party fees | Guarded |
| Q1 FY27 (18 Jul 2026) | PAT ₹19,060 cr (+5.0%; adj. +9.8%), missing the ₹19,332 cr estimate; NII +6.7%; NIM 3.26%; CASA 32.3%; GNPA 1.17%; PCR 66%; advances +15.4% | Jagdishan: "on the verge of pressing the pedal"; the CoF gap vs history "doesn't change in a hurry". CFO: ₹40–50k cr of bonds maturing in 2 years; replacing ~7% borrowings with ~6% TDs saves 100–125 bp on that slice; ECL impact "nothing material"; profit growth "at or above balance-sheet growth" longer-term; CASA ~38% in 2–3 years. On CEO reappointment: "work in process" | Tara Capital: has margin bottomed (no answer)? Emkay: wholesale deposits 17% → 20%. Bernstein: branch productivity lags peers (mule-account guardrails). Macquarie: path to 40% CASA. CLSA: retail stuck at 7–8% | Defensive |
Market reaction to Q1 FY27: −5% on 20 Jul (low ₹780.85) and −9.3% over the week. Investec downgraded to HOLD (₹920); most others kept BUY with cut targets.
Guidance vs outcome (credibility tracker)
| Guidance | Given | Outcome | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| FY25 loans below deposit growth | FY24–Q4 FY25 | Advances +5.4% vs deposits +14.1% | Delivered |
| FY26 loan growth ≈ system | Apr/Oct 2025 | +12.0% (loan book +10.9%) vs mgmt system estimate 10.5–11.5% | Delivered |
| FY27 growth faster than system | Apr 2025–Jan 2026 | +15.4% (Jun-26), +16.3% (Sep-26) vs system +18.1% (Sep-26) | Behind system so far |
| LDR below 90% (85–90) | Oct 2025, Jan 2026 | 98.7% (Dec-25, mgmt; 99.5% gross [calc]) → 94.6% (Mar-26, net) → ~96.8% (Sep-26, gross) | Missed; dropped |
| Q2 FY26 margin bottom | Jul 2025 | 3.27% → 3.35% → 3.38% → 3.26% | Reversed |
| CASA improves as rates fall | Apr 2025 | 34.8% → 34.1% → 32.3% → ~31.6% | Missed |
| Retail back towards 60% | Ongoing | 55% (Mar-25) → 52% (Jun-26) | Wrong direction |
| Cost-to-income falling | Ongoing | 40.5% → 39.2% | Delivered |
| Asset quality stable | Ongoing | GNPA 1.33% → 1.17%; credit cost ~40 bp | Delivered |
| LCR 110–120% | Apr 2026 | 114–115% | At low end |
What to listen for on 17 Oct 2026
- NIM: is 3.26% the trough? Watch the impact of TD-heavy deposit growth (CASA ~31.6%) and FCNR, against the 7 Oct repo hike.
- Agri/El Niño slippages and PL/card delinquencies; whether contingent buffers are rebuilt ahead of ECL.
- Any statement on the RBI's MSRDC review and the class action.
- Transition commentary: will guidance be deferred to Bagchi?
Growth, Outlook & Valuation
Visibility ("order book" equivalents)
| Metric | Latest | Read-through |
|---|---|---|
| Gross advances | ₹32.20 lakh cr (Sep-26), +16.3% YoY, +5.2% QoQ | Growth re-accelerating |
| Deposits | ₹33.28 lakh cr, +18.8% | Funding growth ahead of loans, but TD/FCNR-led |
| Pipeline commentary | Mortgage disbursements +14%; wheels/unsecured +~20%; ECLGS 5.0 ~₹14,000 cr | Retail to pick up from 7% |
| Capital headroom | CET1 17.4%; CRAR 19.6% | CET1 capital ~₹5.3 lakh cr on RWA ₹30.5 lakh cr; it could absorb ~₹4.9 lakh cr of extra RWA (~₹7 lakh cr of loans at ~70% density) before CET1 falls to 15%, ignoring accruals [Est.] |
| Bond run-off | ₹40–50k cr high-cost maturities over 2 years | Mechanical NIM tailwind |
| Branch vintage | ~40% under 5 years old; business/branch ₹330 cr | Productivity runway |
Catalysts
Next 12 months
- 17 Oct: Q2 FY27 results (NIM, CASA)
- 27 Oct: Bagchi takes charge; first strategy signals; 6 Nov postal ballot
- RBI MSRDC review outcome
- US class action: lead plaintiff, then motion to dismiss
- LIC building towards 9.99%; MSCI foreign-inclusion factor
- ECL Day-1 disclosure (assessments due Dec 2026); ECL live 1 Apr 2027
- RBI MPC 2–4 Dec 2026 (further hike risk)
3–5 year drivers
- Legacy borrowings from 11% to the industry's 5–6% of liabilities, worth a 40–50 bp CoF benefit
- CASA back towards 38–40%
- Retail mix back to ~60%
- Branch maturity (40% young)
- Cross-sell to ~100 mn customers (only 14% hold TDs) and ex-HDFC Ltd mortgage customers (liability penetration 36% → ~50%)
- Subsidiary value compounding (AMC, Life, HDB)
- GenAI-driven opex efficiency
Consensus and broker views
| Broker | Rating | Target (₹) | Date / note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Axis Securities | BUY | 975 | 20 Jul 2026; 1.9x FY28E ABV + ₹128 subs |
| Investec | HOLD (from BUY) | 920 | 20 Jul 2026 |
| JM Financial | — | 900 | Jul 2026, "growth without the glow" |
| Nomura / Citi / Systematix / PhillipCap | Buy | 950 / 970 / 950 / 950 | Jul 2026 |
| JPMorgan / HSBC | OW / Buy | 990 / 990 | Jul 2026 |
| Antique / ICICI Sec / Nuvama / MS / Axis Cap | Buy / OW | 1,015 / 1,020 / 1,025 / 1,025 / 1,030 | Jul 2026; triggers: CEO clarity |
| Jefferies / MOSL | Buy | 1,050 / 1,050 | Jul 2026 |
| UBS / Macquarie / Bernstein / CLSA / BNP | Buy / Outperform | 1,130 / 1,150 / 1,150 / 1,200 / 1,400 | Jul 2026 |
| Consensus (post-Q1) | ~1,030 | ~45% above CMP; most targets predate the CEO exit |
| Axis estimates (standalone) | FY26A | FY27E | FY28E | FY29E |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| NII (₹ bn) | 1,287 | 1,437 | 1,663 | 1,919 |
| PPOP (₹ bn) | 1,186 | 1,226 | 1,449 | 1,704 |
| PAT (₹ bn) | 747 | 818 | 957 | 1,128 |
| EPS (₹) | 48.5 | 53.2 | 62.1 | 73.3 |
| ABV (₹) | 358.4 | 398.7 | 445.8 | 501.2 |
| RoAA / RoAE (Axis calc.; reported FY26: 1.94% / 14.3%) | 1.7% / 13.5% | 1.8% / 13.8% | 1.8% / 14.4% | 1.9% / 15.2% |
| P/E at ₹708 | 14.6x | 13.3x | 11.4x | 9.7x |
| P/ABV at ₹708 | 1.98x | 1.78x | 1.59x | 1.41x |
Axis cut FY27E/FY28E PAT by 4.7%/4.2% after Q1. With the Oct repo hike and the CEO change, consensus EPS risk is skewed slightly down in the near term [Analyst View].
Current vs historical valuation
P/B is 1.87x standalone now. Bonus-adjusted, the stock traded ~₹800–1,000 through 2025 against BVPS of ₹316–353, i.e. ~2.5–3.0x [Est.; a 3–5-year average series was not available from Trendlyne/Moneycontrol this session]. Finology cites a historical average of ~2.8x. P/E is 14.4x TTM against a 10-year EPS CAGR of ~20%. The stock is at a ~32% P/B discount to ICICI (2.74x) and in line with Axis (1.83x). Dividend yield is 2.19%. There have been no buybacks; banks rarely buy back.
Dividends and bonus history
| FY | Declared (per share, pre-bonus basis) | Bonus-adjusted DPS (₹) | Payout | Record / payment dates |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY22 | ₹15.50 final | 7.75 | 23% | n/v |
| FY23 | ₹19.00 final | 9.50 | 24% | n/v |
| FY24 | ₹19.50 final | 9.75 | 24% | n/v |
| FY25 | ₹22.00 final | 11.00 | 25% | Record date 27 Jun 2025 |
| FY26 | ₹5 special interim (pre-bonus) = ₹2.50 post-bonus, plus ₹13 final (post-bonus) | 15.50 | 32% | Special interim declared 19 Jul 2025, paid 11 Aug 2025; final record date 19 Jun 2026 (AGM 5 Aug 2026) |
| Bonus | First-ever 1:1 bonus, announced 19 Jul 2025 with Q1 FY26 results; record date reported as 27 Aug 2025 (not re-fetched); bonus issue dated 28 Aug 2025 per the FY26 Form 20-F [Fact]. Share count ~765 cr → ~1,539 cr. Not dilutive. | |||
Dividend yield at ₹708: 2.19% on FY26 DPS ₹15.5 (1.84% on the ₹13 final alone). No buyback history. Payout rose to 32% in FY26 because of the special dividend, which was funded by the HDB IPO gain. With CET1 at 17.4%, there is room for a higher payout or special dividends [Analyst View].
SOTP valuation [Est. / Analyst View]
| Component | Basis | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Core bank | x FY28E ABV ₹445.8 (Axis) | 1.3x = 580 | 1.8x = 802 | 2.2x = 981 |
| HDFC Life (50.54%) | Market value 12 Oct 2026 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| HDFC AMC (52.34%) | Market value | 33 | 33 | 33 |
| HDB Financial (74.12%) | Market value | 24 | 24 | 24 |
| HDFC ERGO + HDFC Securities | Axis FY28E values (₹7 + ₹16) | 23 | 23 | 23 |
| Holding-company discount | 30% (−36) | 20% (−24) | 0% | |
| Value per share | ~664 | ~898 | ~1,101 | |
| vs CMP ₹708 | −6% | +27% | +56% | |
| Probability | 25% | 55% | 20% | |
| Probability-weighted value | ~₹880 (+24%) | |||
Subsidiary market values at 12 Oct 2026 prices (Screener):
- HDFC Life: ₹1,21,632 cr × 50.54% = ₹61,473 cr.
- HDFC AMC: ₹98,275 cr × 52.34% = ₹51,437 cr.
- HDB: ₹49,017 cr × 74.12% = ₹36,331 cr.
- Total ₹1,49,241 cr ÷ 1,540.1 cr shares = ₹96.9/share.
At the CMP, the implied core-bank P/B is ~1.66x (core BV ≈ ₹370 after ₹9.2/share investment at cost). Scenario logic:
- Bear: RBI MSRDC penalty plus restrictions; NIM stuck at 3.2%; a new-CEO kitchen-sink; RoE ~12–13%.
- Base: NIM stabilises at 3.3–3.4%; CASA bottoms; RoA ~1.8%.
- Bull: NIM recovers to 3.5% by FY28, a clean transition, and governance resolves, re-rating towards the long-run 2.2–2.5x.
Final Verdict
Bull case
- NIM troughs at 3.26%. Bond run-off (₹40–50k cr), EBLR repricing in a hike cycle and a retail-mix rebuild lift NIM to 3.5% by FY28; RoA returns to 2%.
- Bagchi, an ICICI retail-liability builder, accelerates CASA and cross-sell. The governance cloud lifts after an RBI outcome without restrictions, and the stock re-rates to 2.2x+.
- Technical flows reverse: LIC to 9.99%, the MSCI foreign-inclusion uplift, and FII under-ownership at 39% (vs ~50% historically).
Bear case
- The RBI's MSRDC review brings a penalty, remuneration clawback or business restriction (the 2020 precedent), extending the de-rating.
- The deposit war in a hike cycle keeps CoF sticky. CASA slides below 31%, NIM stays at ~3.2%, and RoE is stuck at 13–14%, so the stock is a "PSU-like" 1.3–1.5x book.
- The new CEO kitchen-sinks (ECL buffers, unsecured stress, agri/El Niño), resets guidance and loses senior talent (Bharucha).
Base case (12–18 months)
Two to three noisy quarters under the new CEO: NIM 3.25–3.35%, loan growth 15–16%, PAT growth ~9–11%, credit cost ~45–50 bp. The RBI closes MSRDC with a modest monetary penalty. The stock re-rates partially to ~1.8x FY28E core ABV plus subsidiaries: ~₹898 (+27%). The probability-weighted value is ~₹880.
5 things to remember
- This is a governance and margin de-rating, not a credit problem. GNPA is 1.17%, with ₹72,400 cr of provisions and CET1 at 17.4%.
- The post-merger LDR target (85–90%) has been abandoned in practice. The LDR is ~97% and CASA 31.6%. CASA, not the LDR, is the NIM lever.
- Q1 FY27 NIM of 3.26% is the post-merger low, and management will not call a bottom.
- An entirely new top team: Chair (Jul 2026), CEO Anup Bagchi (27 Oct 2026), CFO Puneet Sharma (1 Dec 2026), CCO (Jan 2027).
- At ₹708 you pay ~1.66x book for the core bank after deducting ~₹96/share for all subsidiaries (net of a 20% holding discount). The listed stakes alone are worth ~₹97/share at market (₹1.49 lakh cr).
5 questions to ask before investing
- What exactly did the RBI conclude on MSRDC, and does it restrict any business or remuneration?
- Will Bagchi re-base FY27–28 guidance or provisions in his first two quarters, and is Kaizad Bharucha staying?
- What is the cost of the US$11.5 bn FCNR(B) money and its maturity profile, and how much of Q2 deposit growth is wholesale?
- What is the quantified ECL Day-1 impact on CET1 (due by Dec 2026 assessments)?
- Can CASA stop falling in a hike cycle, and what is the CoF path as ₹1.22 lakh cr of FY27 debt matures?
Sources
Company filings, results and presentations
- Q1 FY27 press release (18 Jul 2026): hdfc.bank.in, press-release-june-2026.pdf
- Q1 FY27 earnings presentation: q1fy27-earnings-presentation.pdf
- Q4 FY26 press release (18 Apr 2026): press-release-march-2026.pdf
- Q3 FY26 press release: press-release-december-2025.pdf
- Q2 FY26 press release: press-release-september-2025.pdf
- Q1 FY26 press release: press-release-june-2025.pdf
- Q4 FY26 call transcript: HDFCBank-Analyst-Apr18-2026-vF.pdf
- Q2 FY26 call transcript: earnings-call-transcript-q2fy26.pdf
- Form 20-F FY2026 (filed 29 Jul 2026): sec.gov d88195d20f.htm, with XBRL R69/R98/R112/R113/R124/R128/R130
- 6-K Q1 FY27 results: sec.gov; Q4 FY26: sec.gov; Q4 FY25: sec.gov
- 6-K Q2 FY27 business update (~4 Oct 2026): sec.gov
- 6-K Bagchi appointment: sec.gov; Jagdishan not seeking reappointment: sec.gov
- 6-K chairman resignation: sec.gov; law-firm review: sec.gov
- 6-K MSRDC outcome: sec.gov; media clarification: sec.gov
- 6-K AGM outcome: sec.gov; LIC 9.99%: sec.gov; India Ratings: sec.gov
- 6-K AT1 calls: US$, INR; HDFC Life investment: sec.gov; CCO change: sec.gov
- FY26 Integrated Annual Report and BRSR (excerpts only; PDFs not parseable): IR26, BRSR
Financial databases and market data
- Screener HDFCBANK standalone and consolidated (CMP ₹708 at 12:41 IST, 12 Oct 2026; shareholding to Sep-26)
- Screener HDFCLIFE, HDFCAMC, HDBFS, ICICIBANK, SBIN, KOTAKBANK, AXISBANK, INDUSINDBK
- Upstox shareholding; Anand Rathi (₹715.10 on 17 Sep 2026); Finology; Tickertape
- Q2 FY27 business update coverage: ICICIdirect, Sahi, ScanX, Anant Chaudhary
- Q2 results date: Angel One, PSU Connect
Broker research and concall transcripts
- Axis Securities, Q1 FY27 Result Update (20 Jul 2026), TP ₹975
- PL Capital, Q3 FY26
- Business Today: broker targets after Q1 FY27
- AlphaStreet, Q1 FY27 transcript; Yahoo Q1 FY27; Investing.com Q4 FY26; Yahoo Q3 FY26; Yahoo Q2 FY26; Quartr Q4 FY25
- Investing.com Q1 FY27 slides; Angel One Q1 FY27; Business Today Q1 FY27
Governance, legal and regulatory news
- Business Today, 23 Mar 2026; Outlook Business: chairman resigns; Gulf News
- Legal review findings (BT, 26 Jun 2026); RBI approves Rajiv Kumar
- Moneylife: MSRDC penalties; Outlook: RBI asks to explain fine; MSRDC timeline
- Levi & Korsinsky class-action notice; Pomerantz; Hagens Berman
- Moneylife: Jagdishan exit; Outlook: RBI nod for Bagchi; Upstox: Bagchi pay; ICICIdirect
- BS: Puneet Sharma; BT: new CCO; Bharucha extension; FY26 executive pay
- LiveLaw: SC notice on Lilavati; Moneylife: HC quashes FIR
- BS: DFSA restrictions; Khaleej Times; Wikipedia: AT1 case
- RBI ₹91 lakh penalty; RBI ₹75 lakh penalty; SEBI warning letter
- LIC up to 9.99%; MFs bought ₹17,250 cr; Upstox: 52-week low; ZeeBiz
- Bonus issue and special dividend; FY26 final dividend
Industry, macro and peers
- RBI policy, 7 Oct 2026 (repo hiked to 5.50%): Governor's statement; SCC Online
- ECL: CRISIL; LCR norms: Angel One; overlap rule dropped: Business Standard
- Peers Q1 FY27: ICICI, SBI, Kotak, Axis, IndusInd; Kotak Neo: ICICI vs HDFC
- RBI Bulletin on CD ratio (Sep 2026): ANI; system credit/deposit data (credit +18.1%, deposits +17.31% at 15 Sep 2026): RBI Governor's statement, 7 Oct 2026 (also NRI inflows US$119.2 bn and crude US$116.1/bbl); background: BusinessWorld (different fortnight)
- Cards market share: GrabOn (citing RBI data)
- Ratings and auditors (added at QC review): S&P upgrade to BBB (Aug 2025); S&P/Moody's ratings on US$1.75 bn notes (Aug 2026); 6-K Jun 2024: Batliboi & Purohit appointed joint auditor FY25–FY27; RBI FY25 approved-auditor list
- Subsidiaries: HDFC Life Q1; HDFC AMC Q1; HDB Q1
Data gaps and limits (searched, not found or not verifiable)
- Q2 FY27 P&L, NIM and asset quality: not yet reported (17 Oct 2026).
- FY26 annual report items: joint statutory auditors, full board and committee chairs, RPT amounts by counterparty, top-20 depositors, PSL achievement, fee split by product, NRI/wealth AUM, DSA count. The annual report PDF was not parseable this session.
- Latest CRISIL/ICRA/CARE rationales (India Ratings, S&P and Moody's verified at QC review); second FY26/FY27 joint statutory auditor; FY26 board composition and RPT amounts (FY26 20-F Items 6/7.B not machine-readable at QC review); 3–5-year historical P/B series; MSCI/FTSE 2026 weight changes; mortgage market share; tax demands above ₹1,000 cr; DFSA fine or lifting; RBI final view on MSRDC; class-action case number.
- FMP and Quartr data connectors were unavailable (subscription), so live prices come from Screener intraday and transcripts from public sources.